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A FOUNDATION FOR STRATEGIC AGENDA VOTING∗
JOSE APESTEGUIA†, MIGUEL A. BALLESTER‡, AND YUSUFCAN MASATLIOGLU§
Abstract. We oﬀer complete characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes
of two prominent agenda voting institutions that are widely used in the demo-
cratic world: the amendment, also known as the Anglo-American procedure,
and the successive, or equivalently the Euro-Latin procedure. Our axiomatic
approach provides a proper understanding of these voting institutions, and al-
lows comparisons between them, and with other voting procedures.
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1. Introduction
A proper understanding of the democratic institutions that are used in practice
is a prime concern in the social sciences. In this paper we focus on two promi-
nent voting procedures that are used extensively in parliamentary, legislative,
and committee decision-making, world-wide: the amendment and the successive
agenda procedures. While the amendment procedure is extensively used in the
Anglo-American world, such as in the US Congress, the successive procedure is in
place in many European countries as well as the European Parliament. In a nut-
shell, in this paper we oﬀer for the ﬁrst time foundations of these two procedures
that enhance our understanding of these key voting institutions.
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Both, the amendment and the successive procedures are voting institutions
used to collectively select one alternative from a set of alternatives. They repre-
sent natural extensions of simple majority voting to cases where there are more
than two alternatives. In both cases, the alternatives are ordered, forming an
agenda, and are considered sequentially, taking at each step in the sequence bi-
nary decisions using majority voting. In the particular case of the amendment
procedure, two alternatives are jointly considered at each step, and the binary
choice consists in deciding by majority voting which alternative is eliminated,
and hence which alternative is confronted with the next one in the agenda. For
the sake of illustration consider three alternatives, ordered as (a,b,c). Then in
this case a is voted against b, and the winner against c. The winner of this last







(a) Amendment procedure (b) Successive procedure
Figure 1. Structure of amendment procedure and successive pro-
cedure with the agenda (a,b,c).
In the successive procedure, an alternative is considered at each step in the
sequence, and the binary choice made by majority voting is whether to select it,
or to reject it, and in the event of rejection, to consider the next alternative in the
sequence. For instance, in the above example, voters must in fact decide between
accepting a or rejecting it, in which case they confront the problem of selecting
an alternative from {b,c}. If they prefer a to the alternatives in {b,c} then the
voting ends. Otherwise they compare the next alternative in the sequence, which
is b, with the remaining one, alternative c. Figure 1(b) provides a graphical
representation.3
It turns out that versions of these voting procedures are extensively used in
committee decision-making, as well as in parliamentary institutions world-wide.
Moreover, there seems to be a geographical concentration of the type of agenda
voting institution in use. While the amendment procedure is prevalent in the
Anglo-American world, European countries adopt the successive procedure. See
Table 1 for an illustration.1
Amendment Successive
Anglo-American Euro-Latin
USA Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark
Canada France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland
UK Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands
Sweden Norway, Poland, Portugal
Finland Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain
Switzerland European Parliament
Source: Rasch (2000).
Table 1. Agenda voting procedures by country.
Given, then, the practical importance of these voting procedures, it is not
surprising that they have been subject to substantial theoretical and empirical
research, that has led to the clariﬁcation of important aspects. Speciﬁcally, there
is now a good understanding of the nature of the elected outcomes when voters
vote either strategically or naively (see Farquharson, 1969; Miller, 1977, 1980;
McKelvey and Niemi, 1978; Plott and Levine, 1978; Moulin, 1979, 1986; Shepsle
and Weingast, 1984; Banks, 1985; Eckel and Holt, 1989; and Bag, Sabourian and
Winter 2009). The eﬀect of the agenda on the ﬁnal elected outcome has also been
the subject of intense research (see McKelvey, 1981; Shepsle and Weingast, 1982;
Ferejohn, Morris Fiorina and McKelvey 1987; Dutta, Jackson and Le Breton,
2002; and Bernheim, Rangel and Rayo, 2006). Finally, there are papers that study
which voting procedure maximizes in expectation the well-being of society (see
Moser, 2007; see also Apesteguia, Ballester and Ferrer, 2011). These questions
1Black (1948) represents the ﬁrst formal treatment of agenda voting institutions. Riker (1958)
and Farquharson (1969) study the agenda voting procedures actually used in the US Congress.
See also Shepsle and Weingast (1982), Ordeshook and Schwartz (1987), and Schwartz (2008).
See Rasch (2000) for a treatment of the European case.4
are of prime importance for the understanding of the voting institutions with
which we are concerned.
Here we take a diﬀerent approach, and oﬀer, for the ﬁrst time, complete charac-
terizations of these voting institutions that uniquely identify them. We establish
the sets of properties that when imposed on a decision rule give the same outcome
as the one obtained with strategic voters in the corresponding voting procedure.
We show that the two procedures are characterized by two systems of three prop-
erties each, sharing a common intuition. The two systems of three properties are
formed by (i) a Condorcet-type property, (ii) a property that guides the election in
the presence of cycles generated by binary majority voting, and (iii) a consistency
property imposing structure on the elections across related sets of alternatives.
These characterizations allow a deep understanding of the properties satisﬁed by
the voting institutions, and facilitate comparisons between them, and with other
voting procedures. Furthermore, the identiﬁcation of the characterizing proper-
ties of the voting institutions allows us to evaluate their normative appeal, and
encourages the study of the consequences of relaxing or strengthening some of
these properties.2
The ﬁrst two properties are both Condorcet-type, but follow diﬀerent direc-
tions. While in the case of the Euro-Latin procedure it is the classical Condorcet
Consistency property, in the case of the Anglo-American procedure it is a Con-
dorcet Loser Consistency property. That is, in the former case it is imposed that
if there is an alternative that is preferred to every other alternative by a majority
of voters, this is the alternative that should be selected. This is typically regarded
as a fundamental property to be desired in any sensible voting procedure. In the
Anglo-American case, on the other hand, the Condorcet property dictates that if
there is an alternative that is ranked below every other alternative by a majority
of voters, not only should this alternative not be elected, but it should not aﬀect
the ﬁnal election either. This is clearly another desirable property.
The second type of properties discriminate between alternatives in the presence
of cycles generated by majority voting. Cycles give rise to a diﬃcult problem:
2In section 5.2 we illustrate the sort of voting institutions that emerge when we relax each of
the characterization properties, one at a time.5
which alternative in the cycle should be elected. This is a fundamental prob-
lem in political economy that we show, through this second set of properties, to
be addressed simply and naturally by both voting institutions. The two voting
procedures approach the problem from the same angle, that is, by systematically
identifying an alternative as especially prominent. However, as in the above Con-
dorcet case, they follow logically opposed directions. While the Euro-Latin pro-
cedure involves identifying a prioritarian alternative, one that is chosen whenever
it is part of a triple of alternatives forming a cycle, the Anglo-American procedure
identiﬁes an antiprioritarian alternative, an alternative that is never chosen when
it is part of a triple of alternatives forming a cycle, and that identiﬁes the alter-
native to be selected: precisely that alternative that is preferred by a majority
to the antiprioritarian alternative.
The third and last pair of properties imposes consistency requirements in the
elections between related sets of alternatives. In both cases, the properties impose
structure on the elected outcomes so that the latter do not depend capriciously
on the set of alternatives to vote upon.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally presents the
environment, gives the deﬁnitions of the voting procedures, and introduces the
equilibrium notion used thereafter. Section 3 is devoted to the characterization of
the Euro-Latin procedure, while Section 4 does the same for the Anglo-American
procedure. Finally, Section 5 discusses the nature of the properties used in the
characterizations of the procedures, shows the independence of the axioms by
studying alternative voting institutions, and establishes the connection between
our exercise and implementation theory. All the proofs are contained in the
Appendix.
2. Basic Definitions
Let X be a ﬁnite set of m alternatives and let n denote the number of voters.
For convenience we assume that n is odd. A decision problem is a pair (P,A),
where P = (P1,...,Pn) is a proﬁle of preferences, with each Pi being a complete,6
transitive, and asymmetric binary relation on X, and A ⊆ X is a set of alter-
natives to vote for. A decision rule v assigns to each decision problem (P,A) an
outcome v(P,A) ∈ A.3
An agenda   X = (x1,...,xm) is an ordered list of all the elements in X. Given
the agenda   X, the associated successive procedure or equivalently the associated
Euro-Latin procedure assigns to any set of alternatives A, the alternative that sur-
vives the following process. The ﬁrst alternative in A according to the agenda is
voted for approval. If the alternative is approved by a majority of individuals, the
process stops and this alternative is implemented. If the alternative is rejected,
the second alternative of A in the agenda is voted for approval. If the alternative
is approved by a majority of individuals, the process stops and this alternative is
implemented. Otherwise, the next alternative of A in the agenda is considered,
and the process is repeated. If the ﬁnal alternative in the agenda is reached, it
is approved without voting. Consider the extensive game representation of the
Euro-Latin procedure restricted to the set of alternatives A when voters have
preferences P, and denote by γEL(P,   X,A) its strategic form representation.
Given the agenda   X, the associated amendment procedure or equivalently the
associated Anglo-American procedure assigns to any set of alternatives A the
alternative that survives the following process. The ﬁrst pair of alternatives of A
in the agenda is voted upon with the one obtaining a majority of votes advancing
to the next stage. There, it is paired against the next alternative of A in the
agenda, and the process is repeated until the ﬁnal alternative in the agenda
is reached. Consider the extensive game representation of the Anglo-American
procedure restricted to the set of alternatives A, and denote by γAA(P,   X,A) its
strategic form representation.
Clearly, both procedures are subject to strategic manipulation by sophisticated
voters. In the Euro-Latin procedure voters may approve an early alternative in
the agenda in order to avoid the selection of a later one. In the Anglo-American
procedure voters may pass an alternative only because it can defeat a posterior
one, and not because it is preferred to the one with which it is competing. The
3Dutta, Jackson, and Le Breton (2001, 2002) also consider decision rules in the domain of all
the subsets of X.7
characterization of the equilibrium outcomes under the two procedures signiﬁes
a challenge that we address in this paper.
One drawback with sophisticated behavior is that Nash equilibrium may yield
absurd outcomes. For example, in a simple two-alternative setting, if all players
vote for the same alternative, independently of their preferences, we have a Nash
equilibrium. The reﬁnement that rules out this sort of behavior is the use of
undominated strategies. Clearly, in the former two-alternative example, voting
for the less preferred alternative is weakly dominated, and hence would be elimi-
nated. It is well known that binary voting procedures like the one we study here
are dominance solvable. That is, the iterated elimination of weakly dominated
strategies in the strategic form representation leads to a unique Nash equilibrium
outcome (see Moulin 1979, McKelvey and Niemi 1978, and Austen-Smith and
Banks 2005). The use of Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies is, there-
fore, standard practice in voting settings like ours, and this is the one we adopt
here. We denote by UNE[γEL(P,   X,A)] and UNE[γAA(P,   X,A)] the correspond-
ing equilibria in undominated strategies of the Euro-Latin and Anglo-American
procedures respectively.
3. Characterization of the Euro-Latin Procedure
Given a decision problem (P,A), a Condorcet winner is an alternative in A such
that, for any other alternative A, a majority of voters ranks the former above
the latter. In other words, the Condorcet winner majority dominates all other
alternatives in A. The properties of a Condorcet winner make it highly desirable
as the social outcome of any political problem. This leads us to consider the
classical Condorcet Consistency property.
Condorcet Consistency (CC). The decision rule selects the Condorcet winner
whenever this alternative exists.
It is well known that Condorcet winners do not always exist. The simplest
situation in which Cordorcet winners fail to exist involves three alternatives x,y
and z, with x majority dominating y, y majority dominating z, and z majority
dominating x. We refer to this three-alternative situation as a Condorcet cycle.8
The presence of a Condorcet cycle immediately raises the problem of selecting
one alternative from the triple forming the cycle. A possible approach to this
problem entails identifying an alternative that for certain reasons is given prior-
ity over the rest of the alternatives. This may be so because it represents the
status quo, for example. In any event, this alternative is always selected in every
Condorcet cycle that includes it. More formally, we say that a is prioritarian in A
if, for any preference proﬁle P, and for any triple TA of alternatives in A forming
a Condorcet cycle that involves alternative a, we have v(P,TA) = a.
Condorcet Priority (CP). The decision rule admits a prioritarian alternative
for any set of alternatives.
It is advisable to explore in more detail two simple implications of CP that
contribute to a better understanding of the property. First, note that CP implies
that for every A with at least three alternatives there is a unique prioritarian
alternative. This is easy to see. Suppose on the contrary that a and b are
prioritarian in A. Then, there exist a preference proﬁle P and alternative c ∈ A
such that a,b and c form a Condorcet cycle. It follows that whatever the outcome
from v(P,{a,b,c}) it leads to a contradiction. Second, it is also immediate that
if alternative a is prioritarian in A, then a is prioritarian in every B ⊆ A such
that a ∈ B. That is, there is a great deal of consistency across menus of options
in the determination of prioritarian alternatives.
Let us now consider the third and last characterizing property of the Euro-Latin
procedure. Suppose that the collectivity of voters has to select an alternative from
a set A. A natural process involves dividing the scrutiny of alternatives in A into
three stages. In stage 1 the collectivity of voters, say the committee, decides over
a subset of A, say B, in stage 2 the committee decides over the remaining alter-
natives in A, say C, and in stage 3, the committee decides over the selection from
B and that from C. More formally, we say that a non-empty partition (B,C)
of A constitutes a division of A if, for any D ⊆ A and for any preference proﬁle
P, v(P,D) = v(P,{v(P,D ∩ B),v(P,D ∩ C)}). Notice that in the deﬁnition of
a division we implicitly admit the possibility that some alternatives in A may be9
dropped in the process.
Division Consistency (DC). The decision rule admits a division for any set
of alternatives.
Note that Division Consistency immediately implies that if (B,C) is a division
of A, (B∩S,C∩S) is a division of S, whenever S is contained in A. We now show
that the three properties described above completely and uniquely characterize
the equilibrium outcome of the Euro-Latin procedure.
Theorem 1. A decision rule v satisﬁes CC, CP and DC if and only if there
exists an agenda such that v is the undominated Nash equilibrium outcome of the
Euro-Latin procedure.
The intuition of the ‘if’ part is simple. The ‘only if’ part of the proof proceeds
as follows. Condorcet Priority guarantees that there is a single prioritarian alter-
native in each set of alternatives. We use this to construct an agenda   X placing
later those alternatives that are prioritarian in bigger sets. We then show that
the outcomes of the decision rule coincide with the result in the Anglo-American
procedure with agenda   X, when voters vote sincerely, that is when voters truth-
fully reveal their actual preferences. In order to do so we prove that for any set
of alternatives A and a prioritarian alternative h of A, the sets A \ {h} and {h}
form the unique division of A. That is, we show that the prioritarian alternative
of a set can always be separated from the set, without further consequences for
the selection. Finally we use the well-known relationship by which the result
of sincere voting in an Anglo-American procedure with agenda   X is exactly the
Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies of the Euro-Latin procedure with the
agenda following the opposite order to the one in   X (see Miller 1977). Then, we
conclude that for the Euro-Latin procedure the construction of the agenda places
the prioritarian alternative in X, x1, ﬁrst in the ordered list, followed by the
prioritarian alternative in X \ {x1}, and so on. Intuitively, therefore, under so-
phisticated voting in the Euro-Latin procedure, the strongest alternatives, those
that are selected in each Condorcet cycle, are considered ﬁrst in the agenda.10
4. Characterization of the Anglo-American Procedure
Given a decision problem (P,A), a Condorcet loser is an alternative in A such
that, for any other alternative A, a majority of voters places the former below
the latter. Notice that the Condorcet loser, whenever it exists, is unique. The
Condorcet loser is a highly undesirable alternative and hence not only would it
be absurd to select it as the outcome of a decision problem, but also it is natural
that any sensible voting procedure be robust to the presence or absence of such
an alternative. This leads us to the following consistency property.4
Condorcet Loser Consistency (CLC). v(P,A) = v(P,A\{a}) whenever a is
a Condorcet loser in (P,A).
In the presence of a Condorcet cycle in the triple {x,y,z}, our ﬁrst approach
above identiﬁes an element that is given priority. An alternative approach con-
sists in identifying an alternative that is never prioritized in such situations. This
may encourage changes if the alternative is the default one, or avoid risky out-
comes when decisions are unclear or controversial. More formally, we say that a
is antiprioritarian in A if, for any preference proﬁle P, and for any triple TA in A
that forms a Condorcet cycle involving alternatives a and x, we have v(P,TA) = x
if and only if v(P,{x,a}) = x, with x  = a. That is, alternative a is antiprior-
itarian if (i) it is never selected when being part of a Cordorcet cycle TA, and
(ii) the alternative selected from TA is precisely the one that is preferred to a
by the majority. That is, the alternative a that is considered as antiprioritarian
identiﬁes in each case the alternative to be selected.
Condorcet Antipriority (CA). The decision rule admits an antiprioritarian
alternative for any set of alternatives.
As in the case of prioritarian alternatives, in every A with |A| ≥ 3, there is a
unique antiprioritarian alternative, and also if a ∈ B ⊆ A is antiprioritarian in A,
4Indeed, in the Discussion section below we argue that Euro-Latin and Anglo-American proce-
dures satisfy both this consistency property and Condorcet Consistency.11
a is also antiprioritarian in B. One relevant distinction in the structure of the two
properties is the relevance of the direction of Condorcet cycles. For Condorcet
Priority, if alternative a is prioritarian in A and a is part of a Condorcet cycle TA
in A, the direction of the cycle is immaterial for the outcome from v(P,TA). For
Condorcet Antipriority the direction of the cycle is however relevant. Clearly, if
a is antiprioritarian and majority preferred to b, b majority preferred to c, and
c majority preferred to a the outcome from {a,b,c} is option c. However, if the
direction of the cycle is the opposite, then the outcome is b.
Our ﬁnal property establishes a consistency requirement across sets of alter-
natives. Having identiﬁed one antiprioritarian alternative in a set A, one should
be able to remove those alternatives dominated by the antiprioritarian one, since
one can argue that they are not natural candidates for election, and concentrate
on the rest. The election in this subset must coincide with the election in the
original set.
Elimination Consistency (EC). If a is an antiprioritarian alternative in A and
v(P,{a,y}) = a, then v(P,A) = v(P,A \ {y}).
We now show that Condorcet Loser Consistency, Condorcet Antipriority and
Elimination Consistency completely and uniquely characterize the equilibrium
outcome of Anglo-American procedures.
Theorem 2. A decision rule v satisﬁes CLC, CA and EC if and only if there
exists an agenda such that v is the undominated Nash outcome of the Anglo-
American procedure.
We now provide the intuition for the ‘only if.’ We ﬁrst construct the agenda
  X as follows. Consider ﬁrst the antiprioritarian alternative x1 in X, and place
it at the end of the agenda. Then, consider the antiprioritarian alternative x2 in
X \ {x1} and place it in the second to last position in the agenda, and so on.
If we interpret antiprioritarian alternatives as the most controversial ones, this
means that the Anglo-American procedure places these alternatives at the very
end of the agenda.12
The second step in the proof involves showing that for every P and A, the
election from a decision rule satisfying the properties is the limit x∗ of a sequence
of stepping stones in the agenda. This sequence is formed by: (i) the last alterna-
tive of A according to the agenda   X, (ii) the last alternative of A that majority
dominates the alternative in (i), (iii) the last alternative of A that majority domi-
nates the alternatives in (i) and (ii), etc. The proof of this step uses the following
idea. The last alternative is antiprioritarian, and thus, by EC and CLC, we can
concentrate exclusively on those alternatives that dominate it. A recursive ar-
gument concludes the proof. Finally, we show through an inductive argument,
along the lines of Shepsle and Weingast (1984), that the UNE[γAA(P,   X,A)] is
exactly the limit of this sequence.
5. Discussion
5.1. Comments on the Axiomatic Structures of the Euro-Latin and
Anglo-American Procedures. We have shown that while Euro-Latin proce-
dures are fully characterized by Condorcet Consistency, Condorcet Priority and
Division Consistency, Anglo-American procedures are fully characterized by Con-
dorcet Loser Consistency, Condorcet Antipriority, and Elimination Consistency.
It is illuminating to note the shared structure of the two systems of properties
characterizing the two voting procedures.
First, both Condorcet Consistency for Euro-Latin procedures and Condorcet
Loser Consistency for Anglo-American procedures follow the fundamental princi-
ple of Condorcet-type reasoning. While the former imposes selecting the alterna-
tive that majority dominates all others whenever it exists, the latter imposes that
the outcome should not depend on the presence of the alternative that is majority
dominated by all others, whenever it exists. Furthermore, given the desirability
of the two properties, one may wonder whether Condorcet Loser Consistency is
satisﬁed by Euro-Latin procedures and the same is true for Condorcet Consis-
tency and Anglo-American procedures. The answer to both questions is clearly
yes. In fact we can prove that we can replace Condorcet Consistency by Con-
dorcet Loser Consistency in our characterization of the Euro-Latin procedure.
When Division Consistency holds, then both properties are indeed equivalent.13
Proposition 1. A decision rule v satisfying DC satisﬁes CC if and only if it
satisﬁes CLC.
Second, properties Condorcet Priority in the Euro-Latin case and Condorcet
Antipriority in the Anglo-American case again follow the same type of logic, with
opposite directions. Both properties apply in the presence of cycles, and while
the former identiﬁes an alternative that gains prevalence whenever it is present,
the latter identiﬁes an alternative as unchoosable. These two properties shape
the order of the agenda. While in the Euro-Latin case the prioritarian alterna-
tives come ﬁrst in the agenda, in the Anglo-American case the antiprioritarian
alternatives come last in the agenda.
Finally, Division Consistency and Elimination Consistency both impose struc-
ture on the outcomes selected by the voting procedures across sets of alternatives.
5.2. Other Voting Procedures and the Independence of the Axioms.
We now suggest other voting institutions than the Anglo-American and Euro-
Latin ones, with the purpose of exploring the consequences of relaxing each of
the properties we have studied, one at a time. This illustrates the power of the
axioms, that is, the structure they are imposing, and at the same time it shows
the independence of the properties.
Consider ﬁrst a decision rule that completely ignores the preferences of the vot-
ers, and follows some external order over the alternatives, say a virtue book. More
speciﬁcally, the virtue book establishes a linear order over the set of alternatives
and the decision rule selects in each decision problem the maximal alternative
according to the book. The rule trivially satisﬁes Condorcet Priority, the prior-
itarian alternative in a set being the most virtuous alternative in the set. Also,
given the maximizing nature of the rule, Division Consistency holds since any
division of the set of alternatives is inessential for the ﬁnal selection. However,
since the virtue book completely disregards the views of individuals, it might be
the case that all individuals in society prefer the least virtuous alternative in a set
to the most virtuous one and yet the rule chooses the latter alternative, violating
Condorcet Consistency.
Alternatively, a modiﬁed version of the virtue decision rule would aim to block
the least virtuous alternative, and in so doing would attend the views of the14
individuals by selecting the alternative that presents the highest resistance to
it. That is, the modiﬁed virtue book rule selects the alternative with the largest
margin with respect to the least virtuous alternative (and, say, it respects the
selection of the virtue book in the event of a tie). The rule satisﬁes Condorcet
Antipriority. To see this, note that the antiprioritarian alternative in a set is the
least virtuous alternative. Then, in the event of a cycle, it follows immediately
that the alternative that dominates the antiprioritarian one has a larger margin
than the other alternative. The rule also satisﬁes Elimination Consistency since
no alternative is dominated by the least virtuous one. However, the rule fails to
satisfy Condorcet Loser Consistency since it may be the case that the Condorcet
loser is the alternative with the largest margin to the least virtuous one, and
hence it would be selected by the modiﬁed virtue decision rule.
More democratic versions of the above two rules would involve attending the
views of society when these are consistent with Condorcet notions. The Condorcet
virtue book would select the Condorcet winner whenever it exists, and would
follow the virtue book rule otherwise. This rule trivially satisﬁes Condorcet
Consistency. It also satisﬁes Condorcet Priority since the virtue book is applied
in the presence of cycles. However, it fails to satisfy Division Consistency. To
see this, consider a three-element set, and following a similar analysis to the
one adopted in the proof of Theorem 1, note that the only possible division
involves the separation of the prioritarian alternative from among the other two.
It might be the case that there is a cycle involving the three alternatives and
hence the prioritarian alternative is selected in the three-element set, and that
the alternative selected from among the non-prioritarian ones majority dominates
the prioritarian, causing the latter not to be selected in the three-stage process,
thus violating Division Consistency.
The Condorcet modiﬁed virtue book would similarly rule out Condorcet losers,
applying successively the property of Condorcet Loser Consistency, whenever this
is possible, and behaving like the modiﬁed virtue book when Condorcet losers do
not exist. This, apart from obviously satisfying Condorcet Loser Consistency,
satisﬁes Condorcet Antipriority since the modiﬁed virtue book is applied in the
presence of cycles. However, it violates Elimination Consistency. Consider a
set of alternatives {a,y,z} over which a is the antiprioritarian alternative and15
suppose that a majority dominates alternative y, and y dominates z. It might
be the case that, by focussing on the largest margin against a, the rule selects
alternative y, violating Elimination Consistency.
Finally, consider a binary game tree where (i) all alternatives appear once as
terminal nodes of the tree and (ii) there exists at least one node with two non-
terminal successors.5 Deﬁne, then, the generalized agenda rule as the rule that
selects the undominated Nash equilibrium of the normal form game induced by
the binary game. This rule obviously satisﬁes Condorcet Consistency and Con-
dorcet Loser Consistency. Now, consider one of the special nodes in point (ii) and
four alternatives that are successors of it, two from each of the two non-terminal
successors. It is immediate to see that for any subset of three alternatives involv-
ing a Condorcet cycle, the selection of the rule is the alternative that branches
away on its own from the other two. Consequently, there is no prioritarian alter-
native in the set of four alternatives. Hence, Condorcet Priority does not hold in
general. A similar reasoning shows that Condorcet Antipriority is also violated.
Finally, the rule satisﬁes Division Consistency by the equilibrium nature of the
rule and Elimination Consistency since no antiprioritarian alternative exists.
5.3. Connection to Implementation Theory. We would like to note here
that our exercise can be related to classical implementation theory.6 In the lan-
guage of implementation, our exercise might be restated as follows. Decision
rules satisfying CC, CP and DC, or alternatively satisfying CLC, CA and EC
can be implementable via the undominated Nash solution. In particular, our
analysis shows that we can use simple mechanisms for the implementation, since
the former is implemented using the Euro-Latin procedure and the latter by the
Anglo-American procedure.
The main diﬀerence between our approach and the one typically used in im-
plementation theory is that, in our case, a decision rule is deﬁned not only over
all possible preference proﬁles but also over all possible subsets of alternatives,
while implementation theory typically works over the grand set of alternatives
only.
5Some of the conclusions on the independence of the axioms require at least four alternatives,
such as the argument that follows.
6See Jackson (2001) for a survey on implementation theory.16
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1: We ﬁrst prove that the Nash equilibrium in undominated
strategies of a Euro-Latin procedure satisﬁes the properties. Clearly, CC is im-
mediate. To check CP, we just need to observe that the ﬁrst alternative of the
set according to the agenda is prioritarian. The reason for this is that, if such an
alternative is involved in a Condorcet cycle, its rejection would imply the election
of the majoritarian winner alternative from among the other two. Because of the
Condorcet cycle structure, that alternative is majority inferior to the ﬁrst one.
Finally, any set of alternatives admits a division in which all the alternatives but
the ﬁrst one, according to the agenda, are separated from the ﬁrst alternative.
We now prove the converse statement using a lemma.
Lemma 1. For any A with |A| ≥ 3 let h be the prioritarian alternative of A,
then (A \ {h},{h}) is the unique division of A.
Proof of Lemma 1: We proceed by contradiction. Suppose that (B,C) is
a division of A, with h ∈ B and |B| ≥ 2. Let b ∈ B \ {h} and c ∈ C
and consider a proﬁle P where: (i) alternatives b,c and h are preferred to
any other alternative in A by every individual, and (ii) alternatives b,c and h
form a Condorcet cycle such that c is majority preferred to h, h to b and b
to c. By DC, since {b,h} is a subset of B and {c} is a subset of C, we have
v(P,{b,c,h}) = v(P,{v(P,{b,h}),c}). Given the structure of P, CC implies
v(P,{b,h}) = h and v(P,{b,c,h}) = v(P,{h,c}) = c. This is a clear contradic-
tion with h being prioritarian in A. ￿
Now we deﬁne an agenda   X. By CP, there exists a prioritarian alternative in
X. Let xn be such an alternative and let it be placed at the end of the agenda.
Recursively, given xk+1,...,xn, we can use CP to deﬁne xk as a prioritarian
alternative of X \ {xk+1,...,xn}.
Next, we prove that v is the outcome of Anglo-American voting over the agenda
  X when voters vote sincerely, that is truthfully reporting their preferences. We
prove it by induction on the cardinality of set A. By CC, if |A| = 2, the decision
rule selects the majoritarian alternative, and hence the claim follows. Suppose
the claim is true for any set of alternatives with cardinality lower than or equal17
to p ≥ 2. We now prove that the claim is true for any set of alternatives A with
|A| = p+1. Let xm be the last element of A in the agenda. Given the induction
hypothesis, v(P,A\{xm}) is the outcome of sincere voting in the Anglo-American
procedure γAA(P,   X,A\{xm}). Clearly, by CC v(P,{v(P,A\{xm}),xm}) is the
outcome of sincere voting in the Anglo-American procedure restricted to this pair
of alternatives. Given that xm is the last element of A, it is straightforward that
v(P,{v(P,A \ {xm}),xm}) is also the outcome of sincere voting for the Anglo-
American procedure γAA(P,   X,A). To conclude the claim, we only need to show
that v(P,{v(P,A\{xm}),xm}) = v(P,A). By construction, xm is the prioritarian
alternative of {x1,x2,...,xm} and hence it is also the prioritarian alternative of
A. Hence, by Lemma 1 we know that (A \ {xm},{xm}) is the only division of A
and hence v(P,{v(P,A\ {xm}),xm}) = v(P,A).
To conclude the proof, we use the well-known result on the equivalence be-
tween the outcomes of sincere voting in Anglo-American procedures with a given
agenda   X and the outcome of the Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies of
the Euro-Latin procedure where the order of the agenda   X is reversed, given the
preference proﬁle P (see Miller 1977; see also Moulin 1979).￿
Proof of Theorem 2: We ﬁrst prove that the Nash equilibrium in undomi-
nated strategies of an Anglo-American procedure satisﬁes the properties. CLC
is immediate. To check CA, we just need to observe that the last alternative of
the set according to the agenda is antiprioritarian. Suppose there exists a Con-
dorcet cycle involving alternatives x, y and a, where x majority dominates y, y
majority dominates the last alternative in the triple a and a majority dominates
x. Since the outcomes from {x,a} and {y,a} are a and y respectively, and y
majority dominates a, the outcome of the ﬁrst election, namely between x and y,
will be y, which will be conﬁrmed in the ﬁnal election. Hence, a is antiprioritar-
ian, as announced. Finally, we prove that the Nash equilibrium in undominated
strategies of an Anglo-American procedure satisﬁes EC. The claim is trivial for
sets involving two alternatives. Notice that for any set A with at least three
alternatives, the antiprioritarian alternative must be the last alternative of A in
the agenda, say a. This follows immediately from our previous argument on CA.
Let y be majority dominated by a. Clearly, y cannot be the selected alternative18
in A since y reaching the ﬁnal election against a would entail the election of a.
Then, it follows that at equilibrium the outcome from A must be the same as the
outcome from A \ {y}, as desired. We now prove the converse statement.
Let v satisfy CLC, CA and EC. We ﬁrst construct an agenda   X. By CA,
there exists one alternative which is antiprioritarian in X. Denote it by x1.
Suppose we have deﬁned x1,...,xk. By CA, there exists one alternative which
is antiprioritarian in X \ {x1,...,xk}. Denote it by xk+1. This process deﬁnes
an ordered list of alternatives x1,...,xn. We construct the agenda by setting
  X = (xn,xn−1,...,x1).
Now, given the agenda   X, we associate with each pair (P,A) a sequence of
alternatives in A, t1(P,A),t2(P,A),... as follows. t1(P,A) is the last alternative
in A according to the agenda   X. t2(P,A) is the last alternative in A, according
to the agenda   X, that majority dominates alternative t1(P,A), if it exists. Oth-
erwise, t2(P,A) = t1(P,A). Given t1(P,A),...,ts(P,A), denote by ts+1(P,A) the
ﬁrst alternative from A in the agenda   X that majority dominates all alternatives
t1(P,A),...,ts(P,A), if it exists. Otherwise, ts+1(P,A) = ts(P,A).
Lemma 2. Given A and P, v(P,A) = limti(P,A).
Proof of Lemma 2: Notice that by construction, t1(P,A) is antiprioritarian in
A = A1. Thus, by EC, v(P,A1) = v(P,A′
1), where A′
1 contains exactly the alter-
native t1(P,A) and the set of alternatives that are majority dominated by t1(P,A)
in A1. If A′
1 = {t1(P,A)}, we are done. Otherwise, t1(P,A) is a Condorcet loser
in A′
1 by construction. By CLC, v(P,A′
1) = v(P,A2) where A2 = A′
1\{t1(P,A)}.
By construction, t2(P,A) is the last alternative in A2 according to the agenda   X.
Hence, t2(P,A) is antiprioritarian in A2, and by EC, v(P,A2) = v(P,A′
2) where
A′
2 is the set of alternatives that are majority dominated by t2(P,A) in A2, and
that contains t2(P,A). If A′
2 = {t2(P,A)}, we are done. Otherwise, t2(P,A) is a
Condorcet loser in A′
2 by construction. Then, again t3(P,A) is the last alternative
in A3 = A′
2 \ {t2(P,A)} according to the agenda and given the ﬁniteness of X,
the iteration of this process proves the lemma.￿
Lemma 3. Given A and P, UNE[γAA(P,   X,A)] = limti(P,A).7
7Shepsle and Weingast (1984) proved an analogous result. We include Lemma 3 here for
completeness.19
Proof of Lemma 3: We prove this lemma by induction on the cardinality of
A. If A contains two alternatives, the claim follows immediately. Suppose that
the claim is true for sets containing up to k alternatives, and consider A with
k + 1 alternatives. Take the ﬁrst and second alternatives in A with respect to
the agenda, say x and y. If the alternative x (resp. y) is voted oﬀ, then by the
induction hypothesis, the outcome of the equilibrium in undominated strategies is
the limit l1 = limti(P,A\{x}) (resp., l2 = limti(P,A\{y})). By construction, the
outcome of the Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies in A is the alternative
that is majority preferred among these two alternatives, l1 and l2. We now show
that this coincides with the limti(P,A). We distinguish between the following
cases:
• l1  = y and l2  = x. Then l1 = l2 and this element is diﬀerent from x and
y. By construction of l1, l1 is majority preferred to both x and y. Hence,
l1 is the limit of the sequence associated with A.
• l1 = y, l2  = x. By construction, y majority dominates l2 and hence y is
the outcome of the Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies in A. But
clearly, y belongs to the sequence in A, and since x does not belong to
the sequence in A \ {y}, it does not belong to the sequence in A either.
Hence, y is the limit of the sequence of A, as desired.
• l1  = y, l2 = x. By construction, x majority dominates l1 and hence x is
the outcome of the Nash equilibrium in undominated strategies in A. But
clearly, y does not belong to the sequence in A since y does not belong to
the sequence in A \ {x}. As a consequence, x belongs to it, and it is the
limit of the sequence in A.
• l1 = y and l2 = x. The outcome of the Nash equilibrium in undominated
strategies in A is the alternative in {x,y} that majority dominates the
other. But notice that y belongs to the sequence in A, and x is in the
sequence if and only if x majority dominates y. Hence, the limit of the
sequence is the alternative in {x,y} that majority dominates the other,
as desired.￿
The two lemmata together conclude the proof.￿20
Proof of Proposition 1: We ﬁrst prove that a decision rule v satisfying DC
and CC also satisﬁes CLC. Consider (P,A) and suppose that the Condorcet loser
cl(P,A) exists. We need to prove that v(P,A) = v(P,A \ {cl(P,A)}). We deﬁne
iteratively a ﬁnite family of nested sets Ai each containing the Condorcet loser
cl(P,A). Let A1 = A. Given the sets A1,A2,...,Ai containing cl(P,A), by DC,
there exists a division of Ai, Bi (which without loss of generality we assume to
contain cl(P,A)) and Ci. Deﬁne Ai+1 as Bi whenever Bi contains some alternative
in addition to the Condorcet loser. Otherwise, the family stops at Ai.
Now, from the constructed family, we know that:
(1) v(P,Ai) = v(P,{v(P,Bi),v(P,Ci)}) and
(2) v(P,Ai \ {cl(P,A)}) = v(P,{v(P,Bi \ {cl(P,A)}),v(P,Ci)}).
Hence, v(P,Ai) = v(P,Ai \ {cl(P,A)}) if v(P,Bi) = v(P,Bi \ {cl(P,A)}). That
is, v(P,Ai) = v(P,Ai \ {cl(P,A)}) if v(P,Ai+1) = v(P,Ai+1 \ {cl(P,A)}). The
conjunction of all these relationships leads to v(P,A) = v(P,A \ {cl(P,A)}) if
v(P,Ak) = v(P,Ak \ {cl(P,A)}), where Ak is the last set in the family. In this
case, Bk = {cl(P,A)} and given that cl(P,A) is majority dominated by all alter-
natives in Ak \ {cl(P,A)} we have that v(P,Ak) = v(P,{v(P,Bk),v(P,Ck)}) =
v(P,{cl(P,A),v(P,Ak \ {cl(P,A)})}) = v(P,Ak \ {cl(P,A)}), as desired.
We now prove that a decision rule v satisfying DC and CLC also satisﬁes CC.
We prove it by induction on the cardinality of the set of alternatives. Suppose
that the set has two alternatives. Then, the Condorcet winner is selected by
direct application of CLC. Now suppose that, if they exist, Condorcet winners are
always selected for the corresponding sets, which are supposed to have cardinality
smaller than or equal to k. Let (P,A) with cardinality of A be equal to k + 1
and suppose that the Condorcet winner cw(P,A) exists. By DC, there exists
a division (B,C) of A. Suppose without loss of generality that cw(P,A) ∈ B.
Hence, v(P,A) = v(P,B ∪ C) = v(P,{v(P,B),v(P,C)}). Since cw(P,A) =
cw(P,B) = cw(P,v(P,C) ∪ {cw(P,A)}), by the inductive hypothesis we know
that v(P,{v(P,B),v(P,C)}) = v(P,{cw(P,A),v(P,C)}) = cw(P,A). Hence,
v(P,A) = cw(P,A), and CC holds.￿21
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